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Abstract: Reusing wastewater in agriculture has attracted increasing attention as a strategy to support
the transition towards the circular economy in the water and agriculture sector. As a consequence,
there is great interest in solutions for governing the transactions and interdependences between
the associated value chains. This paper explores the institutions and governance structures for
coordinating transactions and interdependences between actors in linked value chains of wastewater
treatment and crop production. It aims to analyze how transactions and interdependences shape
the governance structures for reusing wastewater at the local level. A transaction costs analysis
based on data from semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire is applied to the agricultural
wastewater reuse scheme of the Wastewater Association Braunschweig (Germany). The results
show that different governance structures are needed to match with the different properties and
requirements of the transactions and activities between linked value chains of wastewater treatment
and crop production. Interdependences resulting from transactions between wastewater providers
and farmers increase the need for hybrid and hierarchical elements in the governance structures for
wastewater reuse. The authors conclude that aligning governance structures with transactions and
interdependences is key to efficiently governing transactions and interdependences between linked
value chains in a circular economy.
Keywords: agriculture; wastewater reuse; irrigation; value chains; linkage; interdependence;
institutions; governance structures; transaction costs; circular economy
1. Introduction
Increasing waste production and the scarcity of natural resources are expected to aggravate with
growing populations and consumption. For this reason, solutions for reducing waste and recycling
and reusing materials are gaining importance. In this context, the concept of the circular economy has
attracted increasing attention from policy, science, business, and civil society. The circular economy
is often characterized as an “industrial economy that is restorative or regenerative by intention and
design” [1] (p. 7). In contrast to the largely linear “take-make-use-dispose” economic model, the circular
economy aims to minimize waste and to keep the value of products, materials, and resources in the
economy for as long as possible [2].
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Moving towards a more circular economy could provide many opportunities, including reduced
pressures on the environment, enhanced security of supply of raw materials, increased competitiveness,
innovation, growth, and jobs [2,3]. However, the transition towards a circular economy is challenging,
since it requires, among other things, finance, economic enablers, and technical skills, as well as
fundamental changes in consumer behavior, business models, and last but not least, institutions and
governance at all levels [3]. The European Commission has addressed these issues by presenting an
action plan including legislative proposals on EU waste policy, areas for actions, and specific measures
to promote the implementation of the circular economy [2]. One of the areas for action proposed in the
plan is the promotion of reusing treated wastewater in agriculture.
In safe conditions, the reuse of wastewater presents an opportunity to reduce the demands on
natural water resources and the discharge of pollutants to surface water bodies [4]. Furthermore, it
can increase crop yields [5–7] and reduce purification levels and wastewater treatment costs [8–10].
Since wastewater supplies nutrients, it can also reduce the application of mineral fertilizer and
decrease fertilization costs [9,11]. Concerns about the reuse of wastewater in agriculture include
potential health risks for farm workers and food consumers [12,13], soil salinization [14], and the
accumulation of hazardous substances in soil and crops [13,15–19]. When reusing wastewater for
irrigation, adequate risk management strategies, including the application of proper purification levels,
periodic monitoring of soil and crop properties, as well as suitable irrigation, cultivation, and harvesting
practices, are indispensable to minimize hazards to humans and the environment [4,14,20,21].
Reusing wastewater in agriculture is characterized by transactions between the value chains of
wastewater treatment and crop production, like the irrigation of wastewater for cultivating crops.
The transactions create linkages and interdependences between the value chains due to shared
resources (e.g., land), input–output relations (e.g., water and nutrients), and interdependences of
activities and actors (e.g., interdependence of irrigation and crop cultivation practices and the respective
providers and users of water) [9]. As a result of such linkages and interdependences, linked regional
value chains and value cycles may develop [9]. Empirical studies show that value chains integrated
within local economic cycles can reduce costs [22] and contribute to an increment of added-value for
regional economies [23–26]. Findings from an added-value analysis provide evidence that linking
the value chains of wastewater treatment and crop production by reusing wastewater can conserve
natural resources and lead to significant cost savings, added-value gains, and a high share of local
added-value [9].
However, despite the benefits associated with wastewater reuse, there is still no widespread
implementation of wastewater reuse applications in the European Union [27]. Studies on the reuse
of wastewater show that the challenges for implementing more reuse applications lie, among others,
in the design of institutions and governance structures for reusing wastewater [27–32]. At the EU level,
no common standards or quality guidelines for wastewater reuse have been implemented yet [28,33].
Instead, member states are expected to adopt the requirements of various EU directives correlated
with water reuse applications due to health and environmental concerns [28,33]. The principal
directives with implications for wastewater reuse are the Water Framework Directive and the Urban
Waste Water Treatment Directive. The Water Framework Directive establishes “a framework for action in
the field of water policy and indirectly recognizes reuse as a strategy for increasing water availability,
which thereby contributes to the good quality status of water bodies” [33] (p. 560). The Urban Waste
Water Treatment Directive concerns the quality of wastewater discharged to receiving waters and
states that “treated wastewater shall be reused whenever appropriate” [34] (p. 4). This implies that
“wastewater reuse is acceptable in as much as it does not breach other EU legislation or national
laws” [33] (p. 560). Other directives containing provisions that are relevant to water reuse include the
Groundwater Directive, the Drinking Water Directive, the Sewage Sludge Directive, the Nitrates Directive,
the Thematic Strategy for Soil Protection, the Bathing Water Directive, the Freshwaters Fish Directive,
the Habitats Directive, and the Industrial Emissions Directive [28]. Remarkably, none of the directives
“is directed at regulating or supporting water reuse as such” [33] (p. 561). Moreover, the non-existence
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of common criteria at the EU level for managing health and environmental risks related to water reuse
is a cause of mistrust in the safety of water reuse practices and thus, one of the main obstacles for water
reuse in Europe [33,35]. The EU Commission aims to overcome this barrier by proposing EU minimum
quality requirements for water reuse in agricultural irrigation and aquifer recharge [35]. However,
the proposed requirements are still being discussed [36] and have not yet become legally binding.
With the growing need for a transition towards a circular economy and the potential of
wastewater reuse in terms of economic and environmental benefits, there is an increasing interest
not only in developing common wastewater reuse criteria at the EU level, but also in appropriate
governance solutions for wastewater reuse and interdependent value chains at the local scale [9].
This requires more research on the governance structures for reusing wastewater including analysis
of the specific transactions and interdependences between the value chains of wastewater treatment
and crop production and analysis of the alignment of governance structures with transactions
and interdependences. The alignment of governance structures with transactions is essential since
misalignments can result in lower profitability and higher failure rates [37–40].
Existing studies on the governance of wastewater reuse have analyzed different applications for
wastewater, including agricultural uses as well as urban, industrial, and potable uses. The studies
have focused either on collaboration and risk management [41], or referred predominantly to the
institutional challenges for the wastewater reuse sector at higher levels of governance, including
regulatory and legislative issues at the national and international level [28,29,33,42–45]. Only a few
researchers have analyzed the institutional arrangements for reusing wastewater for agricultural
purposes at the local level [30–32]. Consequently, the empirical basis for deriving conclusions and
recommendations for the governance of wastewater reuse at the local level is scant. Saldías et al. [31]
analyzed the indirect and unplanned agricultural wastewater reuse in Hyderabad (India) and found
that the ambiguous objectives of institutions, fragmentation among or within institutions, and a
lack of regulatory enforcement are major constraints for developing formalized practices. A study
by Al-Khatib et al. [30] investigated governance-related factors that influence the reuse of treated
wastewater for irrigation in Jericho (Palestine) and identified overlapping and unclear responsibilities
among actors, the absence of laws, as well as overlapping and conflicting provisions as obstacles for
the reuse of wastewater. Saldías et al. [32] explored the institutional arrangements for a self-managed
agricultural wastewater reuse scheme in Western Cape (South Africa) and identified the presence of
an effective policy and regulatory framework as a key requirement for the successful implementation
of the scheme.
However, from an institutional economic perspective, there is a clear gap in the current research
on the design of governance structures for reusing wastewater at the local level. The body of literature
is lacking in the characterization of the specific transactions between the value chains of wastewater
treatment and crop production according to their properties, the analysis of the governance structures
regarding their features and the consideration of the interdependences between the actors involved.
Furthermore, the research on wastewater reuse has not yet addressed the alignment of governance
structures with transactions and interdependences between actors. As a result, the understanding
of the governance structures for coordinating the specific transactions that create linkages and
interdependences between the value chains of wastewater treatment and crop production is insufficient.
In particular, to the best of our knowledge, no previous studies have analyzed how transactions and
interdependences between wastewater providers and crop producers shape the governance structures
for wastewater reuse and how the alignment between governance structures with the transactions and
interdependences facilitates reusing wastewater at the local level.
The present paper seeks to address this gap by looking at the specific transactions and activities
in the agricultural wastewater reuse scheme of the Wastewater Association Braunschweig (Germany)
which uses treated municipal wastewater to irrigate food and energy crops. We aim to analyze
empirically the interplay of the transactions and interdependences between the actors with the
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institutions and governance structures of the reuse scheme. In particular, the study will answer
the following research questions:
(1) How do the properties of the transactions and the interdependences of actors shape the
governance structures for reusing wastewater?
(2) How does the alignment of the governance structures with the transactions and interdependences
contribute to the smooth operation of agricultural wastewater reuse schemes?
We assume that by better understanding how governance structures are shaped by transactions
and interdependences between actors we can contribute to developing appropriate governance
structures for wastewater reuse in a circular economy at the local scale. Moreover, understanding the
alignment of governance structures with transactions and interdependences of actors may help to
improve the performance of wastewater reuse schemes in a circular economy. With this paper, we
seek to introduce a novel perspective in the discussion on governance structures for linked value
chains—i.e., the perspective of transaction cost economics—which offers new possibilities for analyzing
and interpreting circular economies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the conceptual and theoretical
framing of the research with emphasis on the transaction cost theory. Section 3 introduces the case
study and explains the methods employed for the collection and analysis of data. Section 4 presents
the empirical findings from analyzing the case study, including a detailed description of the core
characteristics of the actors, transactions, and institutional arrangements of the wastewater reuse
scheme in Braunschweig. In Section 5, we discuss the results according to the research questions
and the lessons learned for governing transactions and interdependences between linked value
chains in a circular economy. In this section, we also discuss the research design and suggest future
research directions.
2. Conceptual and Theoretical Framing
The conceptual and theoretical framing of this research draws on several concepts and theories
described in the following sections, including the concept of linked and interdependent value chains
in a circular economy, the related concepts of transactions, institutions, and governance structures in
action arenas and action situations, as well as the theory of transaction cost economics.
The concept of the circular economy is a very young research field that “still requires development
to consolidate its definition, boundaries, principles and associated practices” [46] (p. 703). A multitude
of different circular economy definitions, varying with the actors and point of view, has been
developed [1,2,46–51] but no commonly accepted definition has become established yet [46,52]. Several
authors stress that the lack of a commonly accepted and shared definition could lead the circular
economy discussion to a conceptual deadlock [46,49]. Bearing this in mind, Kirchherr et al. [49]
encourage scholars to deliberate on the circular economy concept through the explicit adoption of a
circular economy definition to facilitate cumulative knowledge development on the topic. In the study
at hand, we refer to the definition of Kirchherr et al. [49] (pp. 224–225), who describe a circular economy
as “an economic system that is based on business models which replace the ‘end-of-life’ concept
with reducing, alternatively reusing, recycling, and recovering materials in production/distribution
and consumption processes, thus operating at the micro level (products, companies, consumers),
meso level (eco-industrial parks) and macro level (city, region, nation and beyond), with the aim
to accomplish sustainable development, which implies creating environmental quality, economic
prosperity, and social equity, to the benefit of current and future generations.” The circular economy “is
enabled by novel business models and responsible consumers” [49] (p. 229). We adopt this definition
for our research as a working definition, since it provides a brief but comprehensive depiction of the
core characteristics of the circular economy concept, including its principles, operating levels, aims, and
associated implications and enablers. It is important to understand that moving towards the circular
economy implies “a fully systemic change, affecting all stakeholders in the value chain” [53] (p. 12).
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We note that “a circular economy goes beyond the pursuit of waste prevention and waste reduction to
inspire technological, organizational and social innovation across and within value chains” [53] (p. iv).
Applying the thinking of the circular economy to water means to transform the conventional
linear water use model—which is based on extracting, treating, distributing, consuming, collecting,
treating, and disposing water—into a circular water use model [54]. In such a model, “wastewater is not
considered as waste but rather as a valuable non-conventional resource” [55] (p. 229) that can generate
additional added-value [9,22], and that should be circulated to preserve natural resources of water
and nutrients [55]. In contrast to the linear model where water becomes successively polluted [56],
the circular water use model aims at reducing pollution [57]. Further aims of the circular water
economy are the reduction of freshwater demand, the reuse of wastewater [57–59], and increased
retention of water [57]. We refer to this model but focus only on the reuse of wastewater in agriculture.
Figure 1 shows the flow of water in the linear water use model, in contrast to the wastewater reuse
model with crop production. The figure indicates that human water consumption is based on the
treatment and distribution of water resources extracted from the natural system. After consumption,
wastewater is ideally collected for treatment. Subsequently, the treated water is used in two different
ways depending on the economic water use model. In the linear model the treated water leaves
the economy via disposal without further use. In this case, crop production depends exclusively on
extracting water from the natural system. By contrast, in the wastewater reuse model the treated
wastewater circulates in the economy through various options for reuse [59], including crop production.
In this case, the figure shows that the reuse of treated wastewater is an option for turning wastewater
into a resource and reducing the demand for natural fresh water resources in crop production.
Figure 1. Flow of water in the linear water use model and in the wastewater reuse model with
crop production.
Our approach for analyzing the reuse of wastewater in the circular economy is based on the
concept of value chains, and focuses on the linkages and interdependences between the value chains
of wastewater treatment and crop production at the local level. Value chains include “the full range
of activities which are required to bring a product or service from conception, through the different
phases of production (involving a combination of physical transformation and the input of various
producer services), delivery to final consumers, and final disposal after use” [60] (p. 4). In the case of
wastewater reuse in agriculture, several goods and services are produced, including treated water and
crops. Commonly, these goods pertain to distinct value chains. In the scrutinized case of wastewater
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reuse in agriculture, however, the production of treated water and crops goes together. This leads us to
assume linkages and interdependences between the value chains of wastewater treatment and crop
production in the scrutinized case. These interdependences may be due to the joint use of resources
(e.g., land), the sharing of substances through input–output relations (e.g., water and nutrients), as well
as immaterial interactions and interdependence of activities and actors (e.g., interdependence of
irrigation and crop cultivation practices’ respective providers and users of water) [9].
The linkages and interdependences between the value chains are believed to result from different
physical and social processes taking place in distinct action situations located in various action
arenas (The terms “action arena” and “action situation” originate from the Institutional Analysis and
Development framework (IAD) developed by Ostrom [61]. We adopt the terms and related definitions
for this research but do not further refer to the IAD framework.). An action arena is defined as the
“conceptual space in which actors . . . make decisions, take action, and experience the consequences
of these actions” [62] (p. 20). The action arena includes one or multiple action situations and the
actors who interact in the action situation regarding activities and/or transactions [62]. The action
situation refers to the “social space where participants . . . interact, exchange goods and services,
solve problems, dominate one another, or fight (among the many things that individuals do in action
arenas)” [61] (p. 14).
In the present study, we conceptualize the agricultural reuse of wastewater as an action arena
which is composed of three sub-arenas: (1) the provision of wastewater through the value chain of
wastewater treatment; (2) the use of the wastewater as input in the value chain of crop production;
and (3) the transference of wastewater between both value chains (Figure 2). The actors in all
three sub-arenas participate in various action situations. Action situations associated with reusing
wastewater in agriculture include, for instance, provision situations in which actors provide resources
and services (e.g., land, water or irrigation service), distribution situations where actors define the
allocation of resources (e.g., distribution of wastewater between farmers and plots) and appropriation
situations in which actors make use of resources (e.g., use of wastewater and land for cultivating crops).
Figure 2. Conceptual framework for analyzing the agricultural reuse of wastewater.
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The theory of transaction cost economics was chosen as the theoretical framework for
understanding the alignment of transactions and governance structures in linked value chains.
Researchers have used this framework to analyze various problems related to the economics of
organization and contractual relationships [38,63]. Transaction cost theory has also been used in
many empirical studies for explaining phenomena of agricultural supply chains [64–71]. The main
goal of analyses based on the transaction cost theory is to assess the relative efficiency of organizing
transactions while assuming that actors are rationally bound and tend to behave opportunistically.
In our present research, we use the insights from the transaction cost theory to analyze the transactions
and governance structures linking value chains in a circular economy for reusing wastewater and
sewage sludge in agriculture. The basic unit of analysis is the transaction defined as “an exchange
which occurs between two stages of the production/distribution chain as the product changes in form
and/or in ownership rights” [72] (p. 17). The transaction cost theory emphasizes that transactions
are associated with transaction costs because they require information, negotiation and conclusion of
agreements, monitoring and enforcing compliance with those agreements, as well as adaptation of
agreements [73,74].
Transactions differ mainly with respect to the three properties of asset specificity, uncertainty,
and frequency, from which “the condition of asset specificity is the most important” [75] (p. 366).
Asset specificity matters when actors invest in specific assets and refers to “the degree to which an
asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive
value” [76] (p. 59). The fundamental consequence of investing in specific assets is the creation
of a condition of bilateral dependency which may allow actors to opportunistically siphon off the
quasi-rents of the actors who made transaction-specific investments [77]. The property of uncertainty
in transactions refers to the difficulties of anticipating exogenous disturbances and to predict whether
the exchange partners may behave opportunistically [78]. Frequency indicates how often a certain
transaction is repeated.
Transactions may cause interdependences between value chains, when actors or actions are
affected by or depend on each other’s actions [79,80]. Interdependences between value chains or
actors may result “in either conflicts to be solved or opportunities for cooperation” [81] (p. 363).
In order to mitigate conflicts and to realize gain from cooperation, actions and transactions leading to
interdependences need to be regularized by institutions and governance structures [81]. “Institutions
are the rules of the game of a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape
human interaction” [82] (p. 3). Institutions can be either formal (e.g., laws, ordinances, etc.) or informal
(e.g., norms, values, and conventions). In order to implement and enforce institutions, adequate
governance structures are necessary. Governance structures are conceptualized as “organizational
solutions for making institutions effective, i.e., they are necessary for guaranteeing rights and duties
and their use in coordinating transactions” [81] (p. 360). The structures present distinct features such
as incentive intensity, administrative control, capacity for autonomous and coordinated adaptations
and contract law [77].
The feature incentive intensity of a governance structure characterizes the magnitude of the
motivation of the transactional partners to be efficient and adapt to changing conditions [83].
Strong incentives are those provided by transactions in which gains from efficiency improvements
flow directly to the individuals who contributed to the improvement. They stimulate individuals to
innovate and increase efficiency. Weak incentives, by contrast, are those associated with transactions
in which individuals can not personally lay claim to the gains from efficiency improvements [84,85].
The degree of administrative control in a governance structure describes to what extent hierarchical
instructions and monitoring of activities are used for directing the actor’s activities and efforts,
in particular, for adapting to changes and for preventing actors from behaving opportunistically [83].
The autonomous adaptability characterizes how easy the transactional partners can adapt to changes
independently from each other within a given governance structure. By contrast, coordinated
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adaptability describes the supportiveness of a given governance structure towards coordinated
adaptations between transacting individuals [83].
Scholars categorize governance structures according to these features along a spectrum ranging
from the pure, anonymous spot market to the completely integrated firm (hierarchy) [71,77,86].
Between these two pure forms of governance structures there is a continuum of hybrid (or intermediate)
types of governance structures including various forms of long-term contracting, clusters, networks,
symbiotic arrangements, supply chain systems, franchise arrangements, partnerships, cooperatives
and alliances among firms [70].
Market governance structures are characterized by strong incentives and weak administrative
control. The structures strongly support autonomous adaptations based on a strong legalistic contract
law regime. In contrast, hierarchical governance structures are characterized by weak incentives and
strong administrative control. They are strongly supportive to coordinated adaptations, and they
are further characterized by a weak contract law regime [77]. Hybrid governance structures show
“intermediate values in all features” [76] (p. 104) that describe markets and hierarchies. They are
characterized by “semi-strong incentives, an intermediate degree of administrative apparatus, display
semi-strong adaptations of both kinds, and work out of a semi-legalistic contract law regime” [76]
(p. 281). Table 1 summarizes the distinguishing features of market, hybrid, and hierarchical governance.
It shows that an increase (decrease) in intensity in one feature is accompanied by a decrease (increase)
of intensity in another feature.




Incentive intensity ++ + 0
Adminstrative control 0 + ++
Autonomous adaptation ++ + 0
Coordinated adaptation 0 + ++
Contract law ++ + 0
++ = strong + = semi-strong 0 = weak
Ménard [70] identified three empirical regularities within the great heterogeneity of hybrid
governance structures: First, resource users in hybrid arrangements pool some of their resources but
keep the associated ownership and decision rights distinct. Second, the coordination of the resource
users in hybrids relies usually on contracts providing only a general framework which remains highly
incomplete. Third, resource users in hybrids compete with each other as well as with other hybrid
arrangements and other types of organization.
Transaction cost economists evaluate the relative cost-efficiency of coordinating transactions by
assessing the fit between the properties of the transaction and the associated governance structure.
They refer to the discriminating alignment hypothesis which predicts that “transactions, which differ
in their attributes, are aligned with governance structures, which differ in their costs and competencies,
in a discriminating (mainly transaction-cost-economizing) way” [77] (p. 277). In other words: actors
will ideally assign transactions to the governance structure that minimizes transaction costs. Yet which
governance structure fits with which kind of transaction? The transaction cost theory predicts that the
market is the most efficient governance structure for non-specific transactions. By contrast, if the degree
of asset specificity and uncertainty increases, it will be more efficient to organize the transaction in a
hybrid or even in a hierarchical governance structure. Hybrids are efficient in coordinating transactions
when relation-specific investments are strong enough to “generate substantial contractual hazards
without justifying integration and its burdens, and when uncertainties are consequential enough to
require tighter coordination than what markets can provide” [87] (p. 31). For transactions that are
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characterized by high degrees of asset specificity, transaction cost theory recommends organizing
transactions in a hierarchy in order to minimize transaction costs [77].
3. Materials and Methods
We have chosen a qualitative research approach based on case study methods [88–91] for analyzing
the governance structures for transactions and interdependences between actors in linked value chains
of wastewater treatment and crop production. Qualitative research on case studies is commonly
proposed by researchers for studying socioeconomic phenomena with a rather small number of
observations [92], such as the combination of wastewater treatment and agricultural value chains.
It allows researchers to study the complex nature of linked value chains in depth, as it facilitates
describing transactions and governance structures regarding their characteristics and identifying
different perceptions, attitudes and motivations that underlie and influence the behavior of the actors
involved [93].
3.1. Case Study
The case study chosen for the analysis is the agricultural wastewater reuse scheme of the
city of Braunschweig in Germany. This reuse scheme has gone through several developmental
phases resulting in the combination of agricultural reuse of wastewater and sludge, crop production,
and bioenergy production. The reuse scheme is managed by the Wastewater Association Braunschweig
which was founded in 1954 with the aim of implementing a large-scale agricultural wastewater
irrigation system in the region of Braunschweig. Since then, the reuse scheme has developed into a
complex net of linked activities at regional level with various environmental and economic benefits [9].
The members of the association are the city of Braunschweig, the water board of the neighboring city
Gifhorn, and 90 farmers with agricultural land in the association territory.
The scheme treats the municipal wastewater of the cities of Braunschweig and some neighboring
communities. A full biological treatment process produces purified wastewater which is delivered
for reuse from the treatment plant to a selected territory covering a coherent area of 2700 ha of
cropland with infrastructure facilities for irrigation (e.g., roads, canals, pumping stations, pressure
tubes, hydrants). The infrastructure—which is designed for a technical capacity to irrigate two-thirds
of the irrigation area simultaneously—is operated by the association´s staff, who makes daily decisions
about the distribution of the treated water on the farmer’s cropland. Continuous water supply via
irrigation is indispensable for cultivating crops in the region, since the sandy soils suffer from a climatic
water balance deficit [94] and have a low water retention capacity [95]. The main crops cultivated by
the farmers in the irrigation area are maize, wheat, sugar beets, and rye.
Nutrient-rich sewage sludge is another output of the treatment process which is added to
the irrigated wastewater during the vegetation period. The sewage sludge accrued during the
winter season is dewatered, stored, and spread as fertilizer in summer on croplands in the greater
Braunschweig area. The reuse scheme includes a biogas plant which is operated by the association
and which uses energy crops produced with wastewater and dewatered sludge as feedstock for
its operations.
Figure 3 shows the simplified value chains of the reuse scheme and how they are linked by
the physical transactions and activities associated with the agricultural wastewater and sludge use.
The figure shows the outputs from the treatment of wastewater, including treated wastewater and
sewage sludge. These outputs are further processed in the value chain of wastewater and sludge
treatment before they are reused as inputs in the value chain of crop production for producing food
and energy crops. The energy crops produced with wastewater and sludge are inputs for producing
electricity and heat in the value chain of bioenergy production. In this way, the material flows of value
chains are linked based on the reuse of treated wastewater and sludge. Figure 3 displays the actors
involved, indicated by the abbreviations above the single process steps and products, as well as the
focus of the analysis, indicated by the dashed line box.
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Figure 3. Linked value chains in the wastewater reuse scheme in Braunschweig.
3.2. Data Collection
The analysis draws on primary data collected between 2013 and 2016. We conducted six
semi-structured in-depth interviews with eight key actors involved in the operation and management of
the reuse scheme to obtain detailed information on the agricultural wastewater reuse in Braunschweig.
The interviewees were carefully selected according to their roles in the reuse scheme, including
farmers, managers, and employees, to learn about the topics addressed in the interviews from
different perspectives.
The interviews lasted between two and four hours, and took place in the administrative buildings
of the Wastewater Association Braunschweig. The interviews revolved around the operation and
organization of the reuse scheme, the specific transactions and activities between the value chains of
wastewater treatment and crop production, and the interests and motivations of the actors involved.
In particular, the interviews focused on the properties of the transactions and activities, the interactions
and interdependences between the actors, the institutional setting, and the features of the governance
structures. The format of the interviews, in terms of duration and location, was chosen to give the
interviewees enough time, space, and comfort to report comprehensively about the reuse scheme and
respond in detail to the questions. This was done in order to facilitate a deeper understanding of the
case study.
In addition to personal communication, we sent a questionnaire to the management of the
association prior to the interviews for collecting data on the information exchange, communication,
negotiation, contracting, monitoring, and adaptation between the actors involved in the reuse scheme.
The questionnaire was to get a rough overview of the actor’s interactions which we further elaborated
upon in the interviews. We complemented the interviews and the questionnaire with five telephone
interviews to clarify details and any open questions. The telephone interviews were conducted with
some of the previously interviewed managers and employees and lasted between 30 and 90 min.
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Furthermore, we conducted one face-to-face interview with three employees of the local water
authority to gain information on the official permit and statutory regulations for reusing wastewater
in the study area. The interview lasted 60 min, and the interviewees were selected according to their
expertise in legal and practical matters of reusing wastewater. The information was supplemented by
secondary data on the topic [96–98]. All face-to-face interviews were digitally recorded, and relevant
parts were transcribed and summarized. During the telephone interviews, we took notes which were
summarized. Table 2 provides details on all the interviews conducted within this study, including
information about the date and duration of the interviews, the type of interviews (i.e., face-to-face
or telephone interview) as well as anonymized information about the interviewees and their specific
roles in the wastewater reuse scheme in Braunschweig.
Table 2. Description of interviews conducted with actors in the wastewater reuse scheme
in Braunschweig.
Date Duration Type of Interview Interviewees Roles of the Interviewees
07.08.2013 115 min Face-to-face
interview
Interviewee 1 Director of the association
Interviewee 2 Head of the agricultural department of the association;Deputy director of the association
Interviewee 3 Chairman of the association
Interviewee 4 Vice chairman of the association; Farmer operating inthe association territory
02.12.2013 150 min Face-to-face
interview
Interviewee 1 Director of the association
Interviewee 2 Head of the agricultural department of the association;Deputy director of the association
Interviewee 3 Vice chairman of the association; Farmer operating inthe association territory
02.12.2013 60 min Face-to-faceinterview Interviewee 1, 2, 3 Employee of the local water authority
19.12.2013 260 min Face-to-face
interview
Interviewee 1 Director of the association
Interviewee 2 Head of the agricultural department of the association;Deputy director of the association
Interviewee 3 Chairman of the association
Interviewee 4 Vice chairman of the association; Farmer operating inthe association territory
24.02.2014 80 min Telephoneinterview Interviewee 1
Head of the agricultural department of the association;
Deputy director of the association
23.09.2014 65 min Telephoneinterview Interviewee 1
Head of the agricultural department of the association;
Deputy director of the association
23.09.2014 30 min Telephoneinterview Interviewee 1
Head of the administration department
of the association
28.04.2015 175 min Face-to-face
interview
Interviewee 1 Director of the association
Interviewee 2 Head of the agricultural department of the association;Deputy director of the association
Interviewee 3 Chairman of the association
Interviewee 4 Vice chairman of the association; Farmer operating inthe association territory
Interviewee 5, 6, 7 Board member of the association; Farmer operating inthe association territory
27.06.2016 150 min Face-to-faceinterview Interviewee 1
Head of the agricultural department of the association;
Deputy director of the association
06.07.2016 175 min Face-to-faceinterview Interviewee 1
Head of the agricultural department of the association;
Deputy director of the association
20.09.2016 90 min Telephoneinterview Interviewee 1
Head of the agricultural department of the association;
Deputy director of the association
19.12.2016 45 min Telephoneinterview Interviewee 1
Head of the agricultural department of the association;
Deputy director of the association
3.3. Data Analysis
The present analysis focuses on the irrigation of treated wastewater where substance flows
directly link the value chains of wastewater treatment and crop production (Figure 3). We began
the analysis of the interview data by elaborating upon a system of thematic categories based on the
elements of our conceptual and theoretical framework to systematically structure the data. The four
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main categories were (1) transactions and activities; (2) actors; (3) institutions; and (4) governance
structures. These categories were subdivided into further categories also based on the elements of our
conceptual and theoretical framework. The first category “transactions and activities” was split up
into (i) asset specificity; (ii) uncertainty; and (iii) frequency. The second category “actors” was split
into (i) tasks and responsibilities; (ii) interests; (iii) ownership and decision rights; (iv) interactions;
and (v) interdependences. The third category “institutions” was split into (i) formal rules; and (ii)
informal rules. The fourth category “governance structures” was divided into (i) contractual relations;
(ii) incentives; (iii) command and control; and (iv) adaptions.
In the next step, we repeatedly went through the transcripts and notes and assigned all relevant
text sequences to the matching categories. After this, we created additional thematic subcategories
for each category according to the content of the material collected per category to further structure
the data. Then, we scrutinized the transcripts and notes once again, and assigned all relevant text
sequences to the matching subcategories. Finally, we identified the text sequences which were relevant
for answering our research questions and summarized this material.
Building on this analysis, we continued by decomposing the sub-arenas of the agricultural
reuse of wastewater and sewage sludge into different action situations. Decomposing the action
arenas into different action situations allows for better understanding the multiple and complex
linkages and interdependences between the value chains of wastewater treatment and crop production.
After determining the case-specific action situations, we identified the specific elements of the action
situations, including the focal transactions and activities, the participating actors, and their interactions.
We then characterized the actors by describing their task and responsibilities, their interests, as well as
their ownership and decision rights, before advancing with the four-step analysis of the discriminating
alignment of transactions and governance structures as suggested by Williamson [99]:
First, we described the transactions and activities according to their properties including asset
specificity, uncertainty, and frequency for better differentiation and uncovering the needs for regulation
and coordination. In addition, we described the interdependences between the actors resulting from the
transactions and activities; Second, we characterized the actor’s contractual relations and scrutinized
the governance structures in terms of the provision of incentives, the use of administrative control,
and the capacity for autonomous and coordinated adaptations; Third, we worked out the efficiency
of alignment between the governance structures and the properties of the transactions and activities
according to the transaction cost theory. In other words: We assessed which governance structure
would match the case-specific properties of the transactions and activities best. We focused on the
condition of asset specificity, since it is the most important property for determining what governance
structure minimizes transaction costs [75]. Fourth, we ascertained whether the expected alignments of
the governance structures with the properties of the transactions and activities as derived from the
theoretical framing are corroborated by our findings. Next, we analyzed how the properties of the
transactions and activities including the interdependences between the actors shape the governance
structures. Finally, we evaluated how the alignment of the governance structures with the relevant
properties of the transactions and activities, including the interdependences, contributes to the smooth
operation of the wastewater reuse in the studied case.
4. Results
The results section is structured according to the analyzed action situations identified on the basis
of our conceptual framework and the information obtained from the interviews. First, we describe
the actors participating in the different action situations with their interests, interactions, and their
ownership and decision rights. Then, we characterize the focal activities and transactions by their
properties, and determine the governance structures that would minimize transaction costs according
to the discriminating alignment hypothesis. We then describe the existing institutions and characterize
the governance structures by their features.
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Drawing on our conceptual framework and the information obtained from the interviews, the
analysis revealed the following three focal action situations that take place in the action arenas of the
agricultural reuse of wastewater in Braunschweig (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Action arenas and action situations of the agricultural wastewater reuse in Braunschweig.
The focal situation in the arena of wastewater provision is the provisioning of irrigation services
for crop cultivation including the spreading of wastewater as the focal activity of the association staff.
In this situation, the association management interacts with the association staff regarding the practical
implementation of the spreading operations.
The focal situation related to the transference of wastewater between wastewater treatment and
crop production is the irrigation of croplands with the irrigation of wastewater as the focal transaction
between the association and the farmers. In this situation, the association interacts with the farmers
regarding the provision of land and irrigation services as well as the distribution of the water and
other practical matters of irrigation (e.g., schedule).
The focal situation in the arena of wastewater use is crop cultivation with wastewater, including
the choice of crops a principal activity for farmers. This activity is influenced by the interaction between
the association and farmers regarding the crops and cropping patterns on the irrigation fields. The joint
outcome of the physical and social processes in the three arenas and situations is the linkage and
interdependence of the value chains of wastewater treatment and crop production.
4.1. Provision of Irrigation Services
4.1.1. Actors and Actors’ Rights
The actors involved in the provision of irrigation services include one manager of the association,
six rainmasters, and twelve workers. The manager determines the dates for starting and ending the
irrigation of certain crops (e.g., maize and sugar beets), as well as adding sewage to the irrigated
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wastewater. The rainmasters are in charge of implementing the decisions of the manager and
coordinating the irrigation operations on site. They set up the schedules for the workers and
decide about the distribution of the water, based on parameters such as the soil conditions and
the development of the crops. The workers, whose task is to operate the irrigation machines, perform
the operations only according to instructions from actors in the upper levels of the associations’
hierarchy i.e., the rainmasters and the manager. All assets used by the association staff for providing
irrigation-related services belong to the association. Neither the manager nor the rainmasters or the
workers hold rights of ownership of the assets used for the operations. The interactions between
the manager, the rainmasters, and the workers are driven by the interest of the association to spread
the wastewater for reuse in a proper way without causing damage to the farmers, the residents, and
the environment.
4.1.2. Focal Activity
The activity of spreading wastewater is characterized by a relatively high frequency of about
seven to eight times throughout the vegetation period. The physical infrastructure (e.g., canals, pumps,
pressure tubes, hydrants, irrigation machines) for spreading wastewater is highly specific in its use
and site, as it cannot be easily moved nor used for other purposes.
The spreading of wastewater causes interdependences between the association and the farmers,
since the crop yields of the farmer’s depend, among other factors, on the ability of the association staff
to spread the wastewater and sewage in a safe way without damaging crops and soils. The association
has built up a good reputation for the safety and quality of the spreading operations. This reputation
is indispensable to maintaining the trust of the farmers in the association and wastewater cultivation.
The skills and experiences of the personnel operating the irrigation system are not specific to the
spreading of wastewater as they may be easily utilized for similar activities in the agricultural sector.
4.1.3. Institutional Arrangements
Institutions and governance structures regulating the spreading of wastewater need to secure the
safety and high quality of the related operations. The high specificity of the physical infrastructure and
the special reputation of the association regarding the safety and quality of the spreading, raise the
expectation that hierarchical governance could be an efficient solution to coordinating the interactions
between the association management and the association staff regarding the operation of the spreading.
In the following, we will characterize the institutions and governance structures in terms of the
contractual arrangements, incentives, command and control, and adaptability.
The contractual arrangements between the association management and the association staff
performing the spreading is based on long-term employment contracts, which are typically incomplete,
as they only stipulate the basic conditions of the employment, including the general working tasks
and remuneration. Potential conflicts between the association management and the staff regarding the
spreading (e.g., improper operations) are settled internally within the association without involving
courts or arbitrators.
The incentive intensity for the manager, the rainmasters, and the workers was found to be
weak because the actors cannot personally lay claim to the benefits from cost savings or efficiency
improvements in the spreading.
Administrative command and control is the predominant steering mechanism as the association
manager and the rainmasters direct the operations related to the spreading of wastewater and
instruct the workers by means of commands transmitted in the form of oral and written instructions.
Administrative control, including monitoring activities and outcomes, is strong in order to ensure that
operations are carried out in accordance with the legal regulations, and that the workers maximize
their efforts in the interests of the association.
In terms of the adaptability, we observed that the manager arranges the adaptation of the
spreading operations to any changes in the legal framework or technical matters. On the fields,
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the rainmasters are in charge of coordinating the adaptations of the operations (e.g., the adaptation of
the schedules for the irrigation) to the weather and soil conditions, to the development of the crops
and to ongoing cropping activities of farmers like pest management and fertilization. The capacity
for coordinated adaptations is strong, due to the formal authority of the association manager and the
rainmasters to direct the workers’ spreading activities.
4.2. Irrigation of Croplands
4.2.1. Actors and Actors’ Rights
The actors involved in the action situation of cropland irrigation are the association and the
farmers. The relationship between the association and the farmers is characterized by separated
ownership and decision rights. The association owns the wastewater and the infrastructure of the
irrigation, while the farmers own or lease the land of the irrigation fields. The manager responsible for
irrigation has the authority to decide about the dates for starting and ending the irrigation of certain
crops (e.g., maize) without consulting the farmers, but generally asks board members of the association
with agricultural background for advice. The rainmasters who implement the decisions of the manager
decide about the sequence of the fields to be irrigated. They make the decisions about the sequence
independently from the farmers, but coordinate individual irrigation schedules with the farmers.
The interactions between the association and the farmers are driven by the complementary interests
of the association to release the wastewater and sewage for its reuse into the farmer’s fields and the
interests of the farmers to obtain irrigation services and nutrient-rich water from the association for
cultivating crops.
4.2.2. Focal Transaction
The irrigation of wastewater as a transaction between the association and the farmers is
characterized by the high frequency of the operations and the high specificity of the physical
infrastructure as described in Section 4.1.2. Another characteristic of the irrigation transaction is
the site specificity of the irrigated fields because of their immovability and proximity to the wastewater
treatment plant. Natural rainfall, evapotranspiration rates, crop growth, and soil conditions are
nature-related sources of uncertainty that determine the optimal quantity and timing of wastewater
applications. In dry periods, the crops may experience water stress if rainfall and wastewater are less
than required. In wet periods, the water supply from rainfall and irrigation may exceed the maximum
water absorption capacity of the crops and soil. An oversupply of wastewater increases the risk of
crop damages and excessive inputs of nutrient and pollutants into soils, groundwater, and adjacent
water bodies. The capability of the association to suspend irrigation is limited since wastewater is
produced continuously.
The irrigation transaction establishes a relationship of interdependence between the association
and the farmers based on the complementarity of the resources of water and land, the specificity of
the irrigation infrastructure, as well as the mutual influence between the activities of crop cultivation
and wastewater irrigation. On one hand, the association depends on the cooperation with the farmers,
since the access to their fields is indispensable to releasing the wastewater for its reuse. Furthermore,
the production value of the irrigation infrastructure would decrease if the farmers were to take
land away from the irrigation area or refuse to irrigate their fields. On the other hand, the farmers
depend on the cooperation with the association, since the provision of water and irrigation services
by the association are essential for securing the profitability of cultivation under unfavorable natural
conditions. Other matters that produce interdependences between the association and the farmers are
related to the technical capacity of the irrigation equipment and the practice of adding sewage to the
wastewater. The limited capacity of the irrigation equipment affects cultivation as it requires cropping
patterns that include a variety of crops with different temporal demand for water. The practice of
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adding sewage to the wastewater affects cultivation, since the nutrient loads contained in the sewage
are an important determinant for the farmer’s individual fertilization management.
4.2.3. Institutional Arrangements
Institutions and governance structures regulating the irrigation of wastewater need to know the
irrigation area in its size and coherent structure, and secure access for the association to carry out
irrigation-related operations on the farmer’s land. Furthermore, institutions and governance structures
need to regulate the financial contribution of the association members to cover operating costs, as well
as the distribution of available wastewater among the farmers, especially in cases of mismatches
between the demand and supply of water.
The properties of the focal transaction suggest that a hybrid governance structure or hierarchical
forms of governance are more efficient than the spot market for coordinating collaborative interactions
between the association and the farmers regarding the provision of land, water, and irrigation services.
Next, we will characterize the actual institutions and governance structures with respect to the
contractual arrangements, incentives, command and control, and adaptability.
The preservation of the irrigation area in its size and coherent structure is secured by the
permanent affiliation of the irrigated fields to the association. Farmers who want to withdraw land
from the irrigation scheme have to ask the association for permission, and they are generally required
to provide compensatory areas and to compensate the association for investments, as well as to finance
new investments for wastewater reuse on the compensatory areas.
The interactions between the association and the farmers regarding the provision of land and
irrigation services are regulated by the Statute of the Association. The Statute of the Association defines
the specific tasks of the association, clarifies the affiliation of the irrigated fields to the association,
and regulates how tasks and responsibilities are shared between the association bodies. Furthermore,
the statute clarifies the right of the association to use the land of the farmers for irrigating wastewater
and determines the share of the farmers, the City of Braunschweig, and the Water Board Gifhorn for
covering the costs of the irrigation operations. The financial contribution of the association members
to covering the costs of the irrigation is regulated in such a way that each farmer pays a fixed fee
(81 € ha−1) per hectare of irrigated cropland. The remaining costs for the irrigation are assumed by
the City of Braunschweig and the Water Board Gifhorn according to the quantities of wastewater
produced in both cities.
The Statute of the Association is complemented by the Irrigation Ordinance of the association, which
regulates the responsibility of the association for the operation of the irrigation and the liability for
damages due to improper operations. The Irrigation Ordinance further stipulates the rights and duties
of the farmers to accept wastewater and sewage, and specifies the conditions laid down for the expiry
of the right to receive irrigation services.
The distribution of wastewater between the farmers competing for this resource is regulated in
such a way that each farmer has a proportional claim to the total available wastewater according
to the total size of croplands cultivated. In cases of water scarcity, the farmers generally accept the
prioritizing of fields with particularly sandy soils. These soils have a lower water retention capacity,
and hence, crops on these fields tend to suffer more and earlier from water scarcity. In periods of water
surplus, the farmers accept the even irrigation of wastewater on their fields. In the event of a water
surplus, the association tends to dispose higher charges of wastewater on fields with sandy soils and
low clay content, since the percolation rate is higher in these fields and the risk of waterlogging and
damaging crops is lower.
With regard to the substance flows, the reuse of wastewater on the croplands is subject to the
official permission of the Upper Water Authority, which establishes specific rules and instructions
about the quantity and quality of the wastewater, the sampling of water for analysis, and the practice
of adding sewage to the wastewater [97]. The reuse of the sewage is further regulated by the
legal provisions defined in the German Sewage Sludge Ordinance and the German Fertilizer Ordinance.
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The provisions establish value limits for hazardous substances in the sewage, stipulate the conditions
permitting applications of sewage, define bans and restrictions for the application, limit application
quantities and prescribe the obligation to precisely control and document the reuse of sewage.
The contractual arrangements in the action situation of cropland irrigation are shaped by the
collective decision made by the City of Braunschweig and the farmers during the foundation of
the association in the year 1954, to reuse wastewater in the public interest and for the benefit of all
members. No formal contracts exist between the association as a legal entity and the individual farmers
because the association is obliged to reuse wastewater as a public service. Instead, transactions and
interactions are regularized based on the institutions as defined in the Associations’ Statute and the
Irrigation Ordinance. The rules of the Statute and the Irrigation Ordinance are legitimated by the official
bodies of the association, which are composed of representatives of the City of Braunschweig, the Water
Board Gifhorn, and the farmers. The collective agreement between the association members including
the farmers regarding the reuse of wastewater has an indefinite duration, and can only be terminated if
the members do not benefit from the reuse scheme anymore, or if the association is not able to fulfill its
statutory tasks. The agreements regarding the irrigation of wastewater are incomplete, since it is not
possible to regulate, ex ante, all possible contingencies due to the uncertainties and complex nature of
the interplay between natural conditions (e.g., weather conditions, soil characteristics, and vegetation),
the technological opportunities (e.g., capacity of the irrigation equipment), and the behavior of the
actors (e.g., cultivation activities of farmers). The provisions of the Statute and the Irrigation Ordinance
provide that the association and the farmers resolve conflicts regarding irrigation (e.g., damages due
to improper operations) through mutual consent or by arbitration, in case internal settlement fails.
The association is not allowed to generate profits from the reuse of wastewater and sewage.
For this reason, the association has no claim to keeping profits from efficiency gains, but has to
pass on profits to the members by reducing their financial contributions towards covering the
costs. The incentives for operating efficiently result from the cost competition between the current
wastewater reuse and conventional treatment procedures without wastewater reuse, as well as from
the competition between the association and other wastewater associations in the region. The incentive
intensity of the governance structure is therefore semi-strong.
The farmers have no possibility to direct the operations of the irrigation besides the informal
agreements with the rainmasters about their individual schedule for the irrigation. Every irrigation
operation is precisely documented, and information on the exact distribution of the wastewater and
nutrients is passed on to all farmers and the supervisory authorities via internet, telephone, or in
written form. Operations are also monitored by the regional chamber of agriculture, including soil
and crop sampling, to assess risks to humans and the natural environment. The association and the
farmers perceive the efforts for sharing information and controlling the activities of the irrigation
as semi-strong.
The association and the farmers may adapt independently to changing conditions based on the
existing ownership and decision rights for the land and the irrigation infrastructure. The association,
for instance, does not consult individual farmers when adapting the operations of the irrigation to
new technologies or regulations. However, the associations’ capacity for autonomous adaptation
is limited, because the farmers have the option to block any fundamental changes which affect the
agricultural use of the land in the decision-making bodies of the association. The farmers are limited
in their capacity for autonomous adaptations because they cannot withdraw their fields from the reuse
scheme, or change the type of land use without consulting the association.
Coordinated adaptation between the association and the farmers is enabled under the current
governance structure through association bodies in which the association and the farmers can discuss
and agree upon joint adaptations in formal procedures. More frequent interactions between the farmers
and the association workers also facilitate coordinated adaptations. The rainmasters and the farmers
continuously consult each other when adapting the individual irrigation schedules to the weather
and soil conditions, the crop growth, or the ongoing cropping activities of the farmers. Other means
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supporting coordinated adaptations include the information letters of the association and the annual
meetings of the members of the association. The information letters explain, for instance, changes in
the legal framework and their implications for irrigation. In the annual meetings, problems such as
the correlation between irrigation capacity and the cropping patterns of the farmers are explained.
The influence of these information channels is limited, since they can only stimulate but not enforce
adaptations. To summarize, the capacity of the governance structure to support autonomous and
coordinated adaptations is semi-strong, since both types of adaptation are possible, but subjected to
substantial limitations.
4.3. Cultivation of Crops
4.3.1. Actors and Actors’ Rights
The farmers who receive wastewater from the association own or lease the land and the other
assets (e.g., machinery) needed for cultivating crops. They are autonomous entrepreneurs who decide
independently about the crops and the production methods. The farmers make these decisions based
on market prices, yield expectations, and their individual business strategies. However, the farmer’s
freedom of choice is restricted by some of the institutions regulating the crops and cropping patterns
on the irrigation fields. The interactions between the association and the farmers regarding crop
cultivation on the irrigation fields are driven by the different interests of the farmers and the association.
The farmers have an interest in receiving sufficient wastewater for their crops and cultivating those
crops from which they expect to maximize their profits. The association wants the farmers to cultivate
a wide range of different crops as this facilitates the sufficient supply of wastewater to the farmers.
The association is interested in supplying sufficient wastewater to the farmers, since crop yield stability
and the profitability of cultivation with wastewater are necessary requirements for the continuation of
the reuse scheme from the farmers’ point-of-view.
4.3.2. Focal Activity
The specificity of the farmers’ machines, equipment, and know-how for cultivating crops with
wastewater is relatively low, since it does not differ significantly from conventional crop production.
Uncertainty exists about the farmers’ individual selection of crops. The choice of crops as the farmers’
focal activity is made before the beginning of the cultivation period. Individual farmers may decide to
cultivate crops which are highly profitable, but are not allowed for wastewater irrigation. Farmers
may further decide to produce less varieties of crops (e.g., only sugar beets and maize) to benefit from
a greater share of more profitable crops in their cropping pattern. This behavior increases the risk of an
excessive demand for water in certain periods of time caused by the uniform water requirement of
one or more crops. Since only two thirds of the irrigation fields can be irrigated simultaneously with
wastewater, the association can only supply sufficient water according to the crop needs if the farmers
cultivate a variety of crops with different demands for water over time.
The cultivation with a choice of crops is characterized by interdependences between the
association and the farmers. On one hand, the irrigation of nutrient-rich wastewater increases crop
yields and enables the farmers to cultivate a wide variety of different crops that otherwise would be
unsuited to sandy soils. On the other, it limits the farmer’s options as it imposes bans on cultivating
high-profit crops, such as fruits and vegetables. The farmer’s choice of crops for cultivation influences
the operations of the irrigation as it affects the association’s capacity to meet the demand for water and
to operate the reuse scheme efficiently. Pest control and fertilization also influence the operation of the
irrigation, since they require the suspension of irrigation at certain times.
4.3.3. Institutional Arrangements
Institutions and governance structures coordinating cultivation with wastewater need to regulate
crops and cropping patterns on irrigated fields, as well as the information exchange between
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the association and the farmers regarding the farmer’s crop decisions. Taking into account the
characteristics of the focal activity, choice of crops, like the low involvement of specific investments,
one can expect that a governance structure which is close to market governance is efficient to coordinate
cultivation with wastewater.
The principle mechanism that coordinates the farmer’s crop decisions is the price mechanism
which indicates the current market demand for certain crops. The price mechanism is complemented
by the institutions regulating cultivation in irrigated fields (e.g., cultivation bans). In fact, the farmers
are not allowed to cultivate fruits and vegetables on irrigated fields, due to the sewage component
in wastewater. Furthermore, farmers are required to inform the association about their individual
choice of crops, and to agree with the association on their individual cultivation plan. The cultivation
agreement is an informal agreement which is valid for one cultivation period only, and which clarifies
what crops are cultivated by the farmers. The rules of the Irrigation Ordinance stipulate the right of the
association to decide upon the cultivation plan if the cropping patterns proposed by the farmers cannot
be aligned with the scheme’s operational requirements (i.e., cropping patterns that include a variety
of crops), and no agreement is reached. The association and the farmers normally resolve conflicts
regarding the cultivation plan bilaterally, and with the help of the regional chamber of agriculture as
an independent external arbitrator. In cases of violations of cultivation bans, the association may also
use the option of resolving conflicts through the courts.
The farmers are subject to competition with other agricultural market players. The better their
crops fulfill market needs and the more efficiently they produce, the higher the chance of increasing
their individual profit. The incentives for the farmers to adapt to changing market demands and to
increase the efficiency of their cultivation activities are therefore strong.
The options for the association to direct the farmer’s cultivation activities are limited, as the
association may only object to the cultivation plans proposed by the farmers, and eventually prescribe
a different cropping plan on the irrigation fields, if the farmer’s cultivation plans hamper the efficient
operation of the irrigation scheme. Administrative control is perceived as semi-strong, and refers
to the control activities of the manager and the rainmasters who check if the farmers adhere to the
cultivation bans and the cultivation agreements. The association refuses to irrigate the fields of
individual farmers as a sanction if these farmers violate the cultivation bans, or if they do not stick to
the agreed cultivation plan.
The strong incentives motivate the farmers to constantly adapt the cultivation to changes in
technology and the demand for certain crops. The capacity of the farmers to adapt their businesses
independently from the association is high, due to the autonomy resulting from separated ownership
and decision rights. Nevertheless, the capacity for autonomous adaptations is restricted, since the
farmers need to consult the association about any changes in the cultivation plans as it affects the
operation of the irrigation scheme. The adaptation of the farmer’s cultivation plans in a coordinated
way is supported by the frequent and direct contact between association staff and the farmers.
This frequent and direct contact also facilitates short-term adaptations of the irrigation schedules
to the farmers’ current cropping activities. The capacity of the governance structure to coordinate
adaptations, other than those of the farmer’s cultivation plans and the adaptation of the irrigation
schedules, is weak.
5. Discussion
The theoretical assumption in transaction cost economics is that governance structures are
chosen to fit the specific properties of transactions and to minimize transaction costs [38,77,81].
Interdependences between actors—like in the case of the association and the farmers engaging
in wastewater reuse—are believed to shape the nature and features of governance structures [81].
Understanding how governance structures are shaped by the properties of the transactions and the
interdependences of actors is of utmost interest when aiming at a circular economy characterized by
value chains linked through transactions.
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In the following section, we verify whether the governance structures observed in the case of the
wastewater reuse in Braunschweig are consistent with the governance structures expected according
to the transaction cost economic theory. We start with discussing how the governance structures are
shaped by the relevant properties of the transactions and activities, including the interdependences
between the association and the farmers. We then determine the governance structures (i.e., market,
hybrid or hierarchy) according to their features. We then discuss how the alignment of the governance
structures with the properties of the transactions and activities contributes to the smooth operation
of the wastewater reuse scheme. After this, we will reflect upon the lessons learned for governing
transactions and interdependences between linked value chains in a circular economy. Finally, we will
discuss the research design regarding its strengths and weaknesses and suggest potential directions
for future research.
5.1. Alignment of Transactions, Interdependences, and Governance Structures
Based on our findings, we argue that different governance structures coordinate the transactions
and activities in the action situations of the wastewater reuse scheme in Braunschweig. The provision
of irrigation services with the spreading of wastewater is coordinated in a hierarchical way, and crop
cultivation with the choice of crops is close to market governance. The irrigation of croplands with
the irrigation of wastewater links the value chains of wastewater treatment and crop production,
and displays features of a hybrid governance structure. Table 3 summarizes the main features of the
governance structures observed in the focal transactions and activities of the different action situations
of wastewater reuse in Braunschweig.
Table 3. Features of the governance structures for focal transactions and activities in the action
situations of wastewater reuse in Braunschweig.
Features
Action Situations with Focal Transactions and Activities
Provision of Irrigation Services
with Spreading of Wastewater
Irrigation of Croplands with
Irrigation of Wastewater
Cultivation of Crops
with Choice of Crops
Incentive intensity weak semi-strong strong
Administrative control strong semi-strong semi-strong
Autonomous adaptation weak semi-strong generally strong,but restricted
Coordinated adaptation strong semi-strong
generally weak,
but possible for certain
adaptations
5.1.1. Provision of Irrigation Services
The governance structure used for coordinating the spreading of wastewater is shaped by the
properties of the activity, including the specificity of the irrigation infrastructure, the good reputation
of the association regarding the quality of the spreading, and the interdependence between the
association and the farmers. These characteristics constitute the need for discouraging opportunism
to ensure a continued provision of high quality spreading. The governance structure chosen to fit
with the properties of the spreading is characterized by weak incentives, strong use of administrative
command and control, as well as a strong capacity to coordinate adaptations. These features clearly
indicate that the spreading is coordinated by a hierarchical governance structure. The observation of a
hierarchical governance structure corresponds with the expectations based on transaction cost theory,
which leads us to assume that the governance structure for the spreading was chosen in a transaction
cost minimizing way, following discriminating alignment [76,77]. In particular, it becomes evident
that the hierarchical governance structure responds to the high asset specificity of the activity.
The alignment of the governance structure with the properties of the spreading contributes to the
smooth operation of the reuse scheme. The hierarchical coordination with weak incentives and strong
administrative control prevents the association staff from behaving opportunistically. The strong
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administrative control compensates the weak incentives for the association staff and stimulates good
operating performance, which is indispensable to spreading wastewater without causing damage
to the farmer’s crops and soils. Another benefit of the alignment is that hierarchical coordination
between the association staff enables the association to adapt the operations of the spreading quickly
to the farmer’s ongoing cropping activities, and any changes of the weather, soil, and crop conditions.
Hierarchical governance structures, like the governance structure for the spreading of wastewater,
are characterized by high bureaucratic costs [77]. In the studied case, it can be expected that the
high frequency of the spreading helps the association to make the hierarchical governance structure
more cost-effective. Furthermore, the interviewees reported that the frequency of the spreading have
contributed to developing trust and well-established routines between the manager, the rainmasters,
and the workers. This may also help to keep the transaction costs for the spreading low, since empirical
studies show that trust among actors can reduce transaction costs and improve the performance of
collaborative actions between actors [100,101].
5.1.2. Irrigation of Croplands
The governance structure used for coordinating irrigation is shaped by the properties of the
transaction, including the specificity of the assets and the interdependence between the association
and the farmers. The site specificity of the irrigation fields and the physical specificity of the irrigation
infrastructure, along with the complementarity of the resources of water and land, increase the
interest of the association and the farmers, to give continuity to the transaction and drive them to
engage in long-term cooperation. The association thus commits to providing irrigation services,
and the farmers commit to providing cropland for wastewater irrigation. On the operational level,
the interdependence leads to an increased need for administrative control, including the necessity
for monitoring operations and sharing information on the activities of irrigation and cultivation.
In particular, the actors need to share information on the distribution of wastewater and nutrients,
as well as the individual schedules for the activities of irrigation and cultivation. The interdependence
further results in restrictions for autonomous adaptations, and the necessity to coordinate certain
adaptations, such as suspending irrigation when farmers carry out pest management or fertilization
measures. Last but not least, interdependence leads to the association and farmers resolving conflicts
bilaterally or through arbitration, since conflict settlement via courts is not conducive to preserving
mutual trust and the continuity of the spirit of cooperation.
The governance structure chosen to match with the properties of the irrigation is characterized
by pooling resources with separated ownership and decision rights (e.g., land and irrigation
infrastructure), incomplete contracts (e.g., absence of formal contracts) and competition between
resource users (e.g., farmers regarding the available wastewater) and between other forms of
organization (e.g., competition of the association with other wastewater associations). From these
empirical observations, we conclude that the governance structure for irrigation corresponds to a
hybrid governance structure. This finding is underpinned by the observation of semi-strong incentive
intensity, semi-strong use of administrative control, and semi-strong capacity for autonomous and
coordinated adaptations. The observation of a hybrid governance structure is consistent with the
governance structure expected according to the transaction cost theory, which leads us to assume that
the governance structure for irrigation is able to sufficiently economize transaction costs.
The alignment of the governance structure with the specificity of the irrigation and the
interdependence between the association and the farmers facilitates the smooth operation of the
reuse scheme. The long-term cooperation between the association and the farmers based on the
permanent affiliation of the irrigated fields to the association helps to protect the investments of the
association against the potential opportunistic behavior of farmers. The monitoring of operations
and the information sharing, regarding the substance flows and the activities of the irrigation and
cultivation, facilitates the integration of wastewater reuse into cultivation, by making actions and
activities more transparent and predictable. The restriction of autonomous adaptations prevents
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possible independent actions of the association and the farmers from negatively influencing the
cultivation and operation of the reuse scheme. The support of coordinated adaptations helps to achieve
mutual consent among the association and the farmers about any adaptation of the irrigation operations
to changes in the natural conditions, the cultivation plans, or the cropping activities. Last but not least,
the use of arbitration, in cases where bilateral conflict resolution has failed, has proven to be efficient
in solving conflicts and enhancing the legitimacy of actions.
5.1.3. Cultivation of Crops
The governance structure used for coordinating the choice of crops is marked by the uncertainty
regarding the activity and the interdependence between the association and the farmers. This results
in the farmers sharing information on their choice of crops and formulating agreements with
the association on cultivation plans. The need for administrative control, including the need to
monitor cropping patterns and to sanction violations of cultivation bans, is a further result of the
uncertainty and the interdependence between the association and the farmers. Other implications of
the interdependence for the governance structure include the need to restrict autonomous adaptations
of the farmer’s cultivation plans and to coordinate the respective adaptations.
The governance structure used for coordinating the cultivation with wastewater shows features
that are typical for market governance, like separated ownership rights, strong incentives, and the
support of autonomous adaptations. Other features, such as the semi-strong use of administrative
control, the restrictions for autonomous adaptations, the possibility of coordinating certain adaptations,
as well as the right of the association to prescribe the cultivation plans of the farmers, are not typical
for pure market governance structures, and display features of hybrid or even hierarchical governance
structures. In general, market governance corresponds to prior expectations on the basis of the low
asset specificity in the activity. In addition, the governance structure matches with the uncertainty
and the interdependence by adopting hybrid and hierarchical features into the governance structure.
This leads us to assume that the governance structure is in line with the properties of the activity, and is
able to keep transaction costs low.
The alignment of the governance structure with the uncertainty and the interdependence between
the association and the farmers results in various benefits which contribute to the smooth operation of
the reuse scheme. The sharing of information and the agreements on the cultivation plans reduce the
uncertainty regarding the farmer’s choice of crops, and allow for better planning of the operations of
irrigation. This helps the association to organize the operations efficiently, and to supply sufficient
water to all farmers. The monitoring of the cropping patterns and the practice of sanctioning violations
of cultivation bans discourages farmer opportunism. The consultations between the farmers and
the association regarding the adaptations of the cultivation plans hinder autonomous actions of
farmers, that may reduce the efficiency of the reuse scheme due to misalignments between the adapted
cultivation plans and the scheme’s operational requirements. Furthermore, the consultations regarding
the adaptations of the irrigation schedules to the farmers’ cropping activities prevents the operations
of irrigation and cultivation from interfering with one other.
5.2. Lessons Learned and Contribution to the Literature
Several lessons for governing transactions and interdependences between linked value chains in
circular economies can be derived from the study of the wastewater reuse scheme in Braunschweig.
The study shows that reusing wastewater in agriculture involves various transactions and activities
which are characterized by specific properties. The transaction of wastewater irrigation creates
interdependences between the association and farmers, which significantly shape the design of the
governance structures in the reuse scheme. In particular, the findings show that interdependences
can result in an increased need for administrative control, including the monitoring of activities and
mutual information sharing between interdependent actors. Furthermore, the study shows that dealing
with interdependences requires governance structures that can restrict autonomous adaptations and
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support coordinated adaptations, and bilateral conflict resolution between interdependent actors.
In theory, these requirements can be best fulfilled by features typical for hybrid and hierarchical
governance structures. In practice, we found that the governance structures correspond with the
expectations based on theoretical thinking. In particular, the governance structure for the choice
of crops exhibits features of hybrid and hierarchical governance structures, even though market
governance is still the predominant governance structure for the activity, due to the low asset specificity.
This may indicate that the condition of asset specificity remains the most important characteristic for
determining the choice of governance [75]. However, it may also indicate that linking value chains for
reusing wastewater drives market governance structures to adopt features of hybrid and hierarchical
governance structures to better cope with interdependences resulting from transactions.
Referring to the case of reusing wastewater in agriculture, we conclude that different governance
structures are needed to match the different properties and requirements of the transactions and
activities between linked value chains. Another conclusion we draw from the case study is that
interdependences resulting from transactions increase the need for coordination between actors.
Interdependences between actors should be identified and taken into account when developing
appropriate governance structures for transactions between linked value chains. Last but not least,
we conclude that aligning governance structures with the properties of transactions and activities
potentially contributes to efficiently governing transactions and interdependences between linked
value chains. A better understanding of the governance structures for coordinating transactions and
interdependences between linked value chains is important for developing circular economies [9,22].
Therefore, we believe that the lessons learned from the wastewater reuse scheme in Braunschweig
can also enhance solution findings related to the governance of circular economies characterized by
linkages and interdependences between value chains.
Our research contributes to the literature in several aspects: First, it provides a detailed
characterization of the specific transactions and governance structures for reusing wastewater at
the local level. Second, our study helps to understand how transactions and interdependences between
actors shape the governance structures for wastewater reuse at the local level. Third, our study
provides valuable insights in how the alignment of the governance structures with the transactions
and interdependences of actors contributes to the smooth operation of agricultural wastewater reuse
schemes. In this way, the study facilitates the understanding of governance structures for coordinating
the specific transactions and activities that create linkages and interdependences between the value
chains of wastewater treatment and crop production.
The findings of the study could be of use to practitioners involved in wastewater reuse
schemes and for stakeholders concerned with future wastewater management practices, and the
transition towards the circular economy. We believe that the findings can assist in developing
appropriate governance structures for transactions between interdependent value chains, which,
in turn, can help practitioners, like wastewater providers and farmers, take advantage of the economic
and environmental benefits of reusing wastewater and the circular economy.
5.3. Research Design and Future Research Directions
The results of our analysis refer specifically to the case of reusing wastewater in agriculture, and
may not be simply generalized or transferred without critical reflection upon other cases of linking
value chains in the circular economy. However, the conceptual, theoretical, and analytical framing
used in this study may potentially also be applied for studying transactions and interdependences
between value chains from other sectors.
The conceptual and analytical approach of decomposing the agricultural reuse of wastewater
into different action arenas and action situations proved to be a suitable guideline assistance for
investigating the transactions and interdependences between the value chains of wastewater treatment
and crop production. In particular, this approach helped us to better structure the analysis and to
break down the complexity of reusing wastewater into manageable sets of practical activities.
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The theory of transaction cost economics proved to be expedient for explaining the choice of
the governance structures for the focal transactions and activities within the action situations of our
conceptual framework. However, the theory is static in nature, and thus might be less useful when
it comes to explaining the impact of dynamics between actors and transactions on the governance
structures. The theoretical explanation of the impact of dynamic issues would facilitate future studies
on linked value chains in a circular economy, since the transition from the linear economic model
towards the circular economy is a dynamic process, and the characteristics of actors and transactions
may change and require different governance structures over time.
Regarding the analysis of the properties of the transactions, we focused on the conditions of asset
specificity, which is considered by Riordan and Williamson [75] as the most important transaction
property. Furthermore, we analyzed the conditions of uncertainty and frequency. Other authors
suggest taking into account further transaction properties in order to increase the analytic content of
transaction cost analysis in socioecological systems like agriculture [102,103]. Hagedorn et al. [102],
for instance, proposes the inclusion of, among others, the excludability of actors, the rivalry among
resource users, the degree of complexity, separability or jointness, as well as the measurability of the
cost and benefits when analyzing nature-related transactions. These properties may also be relevant
for the studied case, and can add explanatory power to the observed choices of governance structures.
The methods applied in this study are subject to the general limitations of qualitative research,
including the more complex collection and interpretation of data, the lower robustness of the data,
as well as the limited generalizability of the results [90,91,104]. However, we argue that using a case
study and semi-structured face-to-face interviews to study the transactions and interdependences
between linked value chains, in depth, was appropriate for answering the research questions. We
acknowledge that more empirical work on the governance of wastewater reuse schemes is needed
to prove whether the findings remain valid in other cases of combining wastewater treatment and
crop production.
Future research may address the challenge of measuring the cost and benefits from aligning the
governance structures with the transactions and interdependences. We did not measure the costs
and benefits in nominal terms, since the data required for conducting a quantitative transaction
cost analysis could not be provided by the actors of the reuse scheme. Our approach is in line
with many other empirical studies which confine transaction cost analysis to an application of the
discriminating alignment hypothesis [71,93,103,105]. Another suggestion for future studies is to
focus on the dynamics in linked value chains, and to take into account the development of the
characteristics of the actors, the transactions, and the governance structures over time. In addition,
future work may elaborate on the specific characteristics of the interdependences between actors in
linked value chains. This could include a more detailed analysis of how the degree and the type of
interdependence (e.g., resource-based, technical, operational, economic) influence the choice of the
governance structures.
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